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Posthumanist Hardy?: Rethinking
“the Whole Conscious World C
ollectively”
Hardy posthumaniste ? Repenser “l’ensemble du monde conscient de manière
collective”
Anna West
1 What does it mean to be human in Thomas Hardy’s novels? What does it mean to be an
animal? Hardy’s sense of kinship between the human and nonhuman animal worlds is
well-known, both in his 1909 letter to the New York Vivisection Investigation League, in
which he stated that  “the discovery of  the law of  evolution,  which revealed that  all
organic creatures are of one family, shifted the centre of altruism from humanity to the
whole conscious world collectively” and in his 1910 letter to the Humanitarian League,
where he wrote of “a re-adjustment of altruistic morals [. . .] beyond the area of mere
mankind  to  that  of  the  whole  animal  kingdom”  (Hardy  1984,  373,  376-377).  Hardy
concluded the letter by saying,  “And though I  myself  do not at  present see how the
principle of equal justice all round is to be carried out in its entirety, I recognize that the
League is grappling with the question” (377).  Clearly,  Hardy too “grappl[ed] with the
question”, as his depictions of human and animal worlds in his novels demonstrate. This
article will  explore two questions in order to better understand Hardy’s “grappling”.
First, how does Hardy’s figuring of animals subtly undercut the prevalent attitudes not
only toward animals in the humanist era in which he lived, but also toward women and
the idea of what is human? Second, could Hardy’s approach be described as – in some
sense of the word – posthumanist? 
2 The discussion will  focus  around portrayals  of  woman-as-animal  –  and in  extension,
woman-as-property – in Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891) and The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886)
in order to examine whether or not Hardy subverts accepted humanist attitudes of the
Victorian times in relation to animals, women, and the concept of the human. Set up
against this idea of woman-as-animal, figured in the person of Tess Durbeyfield, is the
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question of man-as-human, for which Michael Henchard will serve as an example. Close
readings of animals in relation to each of these characters will attempt to untangle the
effect that the binaries of human/animal and man/woman have upon each text.
3 In Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the title character is repeatedly submitted to comparisons with
the animal world: especially birds and horses1. On an initial glance the parallels between
Tess and animals seem to be rendered in misogynistic terms. At Trantridge, Tess’s status
as animal – and specifically, as bird – is reinforced by the mirrored role between herself
as caretaker of the birds and Alec as her supervisor. In a sense, Tess becomes Alec’s pet:
Alec re-teaches her to whistle so that she can instruct the “dumb creatures” to sing
human melodies (Hardy 2008b,  65).  While the instance serves as an ironic jab at  the
traditional human-animal boundary (which would hold that birds have neither language
nor the capacity to learn), it also subjugates Tess through Alec’s “superior” position as
male, and in the Victorian conception of the Great Chain of Being, more human. His later
sexual perpetration of her on the Chase – where he prepares a “nest” for her out of dead
leaves and feels his fingers sink “into her as into down” – only reinforces the idea that
Tess is a creature that exists for a specific use, like the fowls at Trantridge whose purpose
is to amuse their owner (80-81). Alec also views Tess as akin to his mare, Tib. Both exist in
his eyes for his enjoyment, and he manipulates the latter in order to control the former,
as can be seen in the scene of Tess’s move to Trantridge: Alec convinces the horse to pull
the cart at such a speed that Tess is obliged to hold onto him. It is of consequence that
Alec tells Tess “[i]t was fate” that brought him and Tib together, given that “Tib has killed
one chap; and just after [he] bought her she nearly killed [him]” (59). Alec’s misogynistic
view of  Tess  is  reiterated by  male  perspectives  throughout  the  novel,  perhaps  most
tragically through Angel’s perception of Tess as a creature and as the embodiment of his
ideal female rather than as a human and an individual. 
4 Yet the categorical boundaries between man and woman that are so distinct for Alec and
Angel seem not to exist for Tess in regard to the human and the animal. She sees herself
as a part of the natural world, undivided by any sense of Cartesian dualism. When Prince
dies, she views herself “in the light of a murderess”, a word legally and philosophically
reserved for the putting-to-death of a human, not an animal (Hardy 2008b, 40).2 Later in
the novel, when she encounters the dying pheasants after fleeing from her own male
human predator, she kills them “tenderly,” crying, “‘Poor darlings—to suppose myself the
most miserable being on earth in the sight o’ such misery as yours!’” She continues, “‘And
not a twinge of bodily pain about me! I be not mangled, and I be not bleeding’” (298).
Ironically,  Hardy’s  narrator  describes  the  hunters  who  shot  these  pheasants  as  “so
unmannerly  and  so  unchivalrous  towards  their  weaker  fellows  in  nature’s  teeming
family”, a statement that, while reading humorously, gestures toward concepts typically
related to the female domain in trivialization of the sex: manners, chivalry, and feminine
weakness  (298).  Here,  it  is  the  narrator  who moves  between the  human and animal
worlds,  using irony to address boundaries set in place by patriarchal humanism. The
birds’ traumatic death calls for a more serious response than that of the maintenance of
manners  and  chivalry  by  the  hunters;  in  the  same  way,  Tess’s  plight  is  not  to  be
trivialized, and neither is the situation on the road that caused her to feel unsafe and to
flee into the plantation3.
5 In his depiction – through the narrator’s and through other characters’ viewpoints – of
Tess as animal, Hardy undermines misogyny by calling upon a trope often used both to
belittle women and to rally in their defence. Historian Joanna Bourke focuses her book,
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What It Means to Be Human (2011), around an 1872 letter by “An Earnest Englishwoman” to
the press, in which the Victorian writer asked “Are Women Animals?” in order to argue
for the protection of women against bodily injury at least to the extent of contemporary
legislation in place for animal welfare (Bourke 1). Bourke discusses the trope of woman-
as-animal both in “misogynist humour” and in “feminist critiques”, giving an example of
the latter from Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) in which
the  author  “railed  against  the  lives  of  ladies  ‘confined like  the  feathered race’  with
‘nothing to do but to plume themselves,  and stalk with mock majesty from perch to
perch’” (Bourke 13). In the end, Tess fulfils her “animal” nature and kills Alec, just as Tib
almost did before her,  revealing that Alec is  susceptible to the same vulnerability as
Prince, the dying pheasants, and later, Tess: mortality. 
6 The trope of subverting misogyny through comparisons of women with birds appears in
works by Hardy’s contemporaries, such as Henrik Isben’s A Doll’s House (1879) and Kate
Chopin’s The Awakening (1899). But what is unique in Hardy is the way this subversion is
linked to undermining humanist attitudes toward animals. By raising questions of the
female subjection, he slips in questions of anthropomorphization and the subjugation of
animals  -  take,  for example,  the  role  of  Prince  as  “breadwinner”,  whom  Tess  feels
obligated to replace after “kill[ing] him” – almost as if through the back gate (Hardy
2008b, 40, 48). While Hardy does not settle on answers – there is a heavy sense of the
iterability of Tess’s tragedy when Liza-Lu takes the place of Tess in the ending scene with
Angel – it is the way he brings up such questions that allows his work to be read through
a posthumanist lens, as will be considered later in this article. 
7 Perhaps the subversion of misogyny in Hardy is most evident in the narrative of Michael
Henchard, the protagonist of The Mayor of Casterbridge who moves from embodying the
fully male (and thus fully “human”) status early on in the novel to losing all sense of his
personhood and identity by the end. Nowhere in Hardy is the subjugation of woman-as-
animal – and woman-as-property – more opaque than in the opening scene of Mayor,
when Henchard decides to auction off his wife. The “joke” begins with the sound of an
“auctioneer selling […] old horses in the field outside” the tent; Henchard, upon hearing
it, wonders “‘why men who got wives, and don’t want ‘em, shouldn’t get rid of ‘em as
these gipsy fellows do their old horses […] put ‘em up and sell ‘em by auction men to who
are in need of such articles?’” (Hardy 2008a, 10). He continues by calling his wife names
indicating her status in his eyes as less than human: terms such as “‘this gem o’ creation’”
and his “‘goods’” (11). Hardy makes the irony apparent by Susan’s dry reference to her
drunken husband as her “‘owner’” (11). After the sale is complete and Susan leaves, the
narrator  moves  outside  the  tent  of  the  auction,  noting the  “difference  between the
peacefulness of inferior nature and the wilful hostilities of mankind” that were “very
apparent at this place. In contrast with the harshness of the act just ended within the tent
was the sight of several horses crossing their necks and rubbing each other lovingly as
they waited in patience to be harnessed for the homeward journey” (14). Here, Susan’s
earlier equation of status with the horse comes full circle: but it is the horse-world that
proves to be more compassionate rather than the human,  subverting assumptions of
human superiority and animal incapacity once more.
8 Henchard’s lack of compassion for his wife – the cruelty of the act, even if it had started
in jest – haunts him for the rest of the narrative. No matter how he tries to atone for it–
rising in success to be mayor and magistrate of his town – Henchard, by refusing to
acknowledge the person of his wife, loses his own personhood. The shifting point towards
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his downfall comes when his past is revealed, and Lucetta realizes, “At bottom, then,
Henchard was this. How terrible a contingency for a woman who should commit herself
to his care” (Hardy 2008a, 188). She marries Farfrae in secret, explaining to Henchard
afterward that because he “‘sold [his] first wife at a fair, like a horse or cow […] [she]
could not risk [her]self in [his] hands’” (195). What ultimately releases Lucetta from her
obligation to marry Henchard and allows her the freedom to marry whom she chooses is
this potential capacity Henchard has for causing suffering: it is the powerlessness that
would come with being his wife under Victorian patriarchy that gives her the power as a
single woman that she exerts over him, destabilizing the very hierarchy that allowed
Henchard to sell his first wife.
9 Beyond this coupled dependency of opposites in the male/female dynamics of the novel,
Hardy links sympathy for Henchard to the animal world. In the scene in which Henchard
saves Lucetta and Elizabeth-Jane from the bull, the narrator calls the bull a “mistaken
creature”, suggesting that the animal had not meant to bully Lucetta and Elizabeth-Jane
(Hardy 2008a, 191). While this suggestion may seem odd when read in consideration of
the bull’s actions alone, the overlap between the bull and the bull-like Henchard adds pith
to  the  human character’s  retraction  of  his  previous  domineering  attitude  in  forcing
Lucetta to agree to an immediate marriage against her wishes, a retraction which is of
course too late (191). Elizabeth-Jane’s sympathy for the animal world is translated, then,
into compassion for Henchard: upon running back to the barn to retrieve a dropped item,
Elizabeth-Jane passes the bull on her way out, “paus[ing] to look for a moment at the bull,
now  rather  to  be  pitied  with  his  bleeding  nose,  having  perhaps  rather  intended  a
practical joke than a murder” (192). The thought echoes back to the opening wife sale,
when the narrator repeatedly insists that Henchard began talking of the transaction in
jest  rather than in earnest.  The “caged goldfinch” at  the end of  the novel  serves as
another image to mirror Henchard’s status in the world of living creatures: he, too, is
caged,  trapped by the conventions of his day and by hegemonic masculinity (299).  If
Lucetta had seen Henchard as another living, suffering being rather than as “this” – a
man who was willing to sell  his  wife in an unemotional,  although arguably rational,
transaction – perhaps the story would have ended differently.
10 Elizabeth-Jane’s  sympathy for  Henchard is  mediated again through the  figure  of  the
animal at the end of the novel: the goldfinch she discovers dead. When she learns that it
had been an intended wedding gift from Henchard, the narrator tells us that “[s]he went
out, looked at the cage, buried the starved little singer; and from that hour her heart
softened toward the self-alienated man” (Hardy 2008a, 305). Henchard’s death parallels
the  bird’s;  as  Abel  Whittle  reports  to  Elizabeth-Jane,  Henchard’s  demise  is  hastened
because “‘he couldn’t eat – no, no appetite at all – and he got weaker; and to-day he died’”
(308). The shift from the animal to the human not only highlights the irony of the ease of
human sympathy for the “innocent” animal in comparison to the lack of forgiveness
toward the human, it also complicates the idea that being a normative male in a humanist
society will guarantee any type of security in being treated as human. This doubling back
upon the hierarchy, as it were, reopens the question, what does it mean to be a part of the
“whole  conscious  world  collectively”?  Henchard’s  note  requesting  that  his  death  be
unacknowledged and his grave be unmarked calls to mind Michel Foucault’s image of
man’s disappearance “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” in his essay on
the archaeology of thought, an essay from which posthumanism finds some of its roots
(Foucault  29).  Not  only  is  Henchard’s  identity  as  mayor  –  the  top  of  the  humanist
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hierarchy in his world of Casterbridge – deleted as quickly as it was gained, his complete
person is elided. Through Henchard’s character, Hardy undermines the humanist concept
of being human: to be human – even possessing all the qualities supposedly required to be
fully human – in such a tradition is a precarious position indeed.
11 Can  Hardy’s  approach  to  the  human-animal  boundary,  then,  be  read  through  the
emerging theoretical framework of posthumanism? As Cary Wolfe points out in his book,
What  is  Posthumanism?,  the  term  can  be  more  difficult  to  define than  its  supposed
opposite, humanism. Despite its prefix, posthumanism does not refer to a chronological
event coming after humanism, nor does it seek to overthrow all the tenets of humanism
itself. For Wolfe,
when we talk about posthumanism, we are not just talking about a thematics of the
decentering  of  the  human  in  relation  to  either  evolutionary,  ecological,  or
technological  coordinates (though that is  where the conversation usually begins
and,  all  too  often,  ends);  rather,  [...]  we  are  also  talking  about  how thinking
confronts  that  thematics,  what  thought  has  to  become  in  the  face  of  those
challenges. (Wolfe xvii)
12 Similarly, Bourke offers a definition that bids the reader to “move beyond comparisons
based on similarities and dissimilarities and inject instability and indeterminacy” into the
discussion  (Bourke  12).  Her  conception  of  the  human-animal  boundary  is  visualized
neatly by the concept of a Möbius strip – a long strip of paper taped into a figure 8 with a
180 degree twist in the middle, creating a fluid, flexuous figure with only one side and no
front or back, beginning or end, top or bottom. For Bourke, the Möbius strip is a way of
understanding Derrida’s stipulation that “supposed dichotomies are actually dependent
upon each other” (12).  This image provides a concrete way of reconsidering how one
thinks  about  the  human  and  the  animal.  Throughout  his  writing,  Hardy  juxtaposes
humans and animals to call into question preconceptions of animal capacities and to shift
humanist expectations of Cartesian dualism. Often there is a sense of following the flip of
the Möbius strip: an image of an animal converges with a depiction of a human, leaving
the reader to question where the domain of one ends and the other begins, but providing
no definitive or stable answers. 
13 Hardy’s love of ambiguity and irony allows him to work in this manner subtly, without his
presentation  of  animals  feeling  anthropomorphic  (except,  at  times,  when  he  uses
anthropomorphism intentionally  for  humorous  effect)  or  heavy-handed.  Rather  than
centering on animals  or  putting humans in the background,  Hardy presents  a  world
where  humans  and  animals  seem  to  shift  between  fore-,  mid-,  and  background
seamlessly:  he zooms in and out on figures upon the scene.  Words like “figure” and
“creature” neutralize the space between the human and the animal, presenting them on
the same terms without the explicit insistence that humans are animals – a statement
which,  as  Harriet  Ritvo  has  pointed,  can  serve  to  fortify  the  very  boundary  that
posthumanist thinkers are attempting to make porous4. One of the difficulties of working
with ideas presented by posthumanism is that humanism often is embedded into the
structure of current ways of thinking themselves: as Wolfe explains, “philosophical work
that takes the moral status of nonhuman animals seriously is, in some obvious sense,
posthumanist”;  however,  “such  work  may  still  be  quite  humanist  on  an  internal
theoretical  and  methodological  structure  that  recontains  and  even  undermines  an
otherwise admirable philosophical project” (Wolfe 62). 
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14 While Wolfe takes philosophy for his example,  one might also apply this idea to the
discipline  of  fiction.  In  Victorian  literature,  representations  of  animals  tend  to  lean
toward human-based imaginings of the animal’s perspective (think, for example, of Anna
Sewell’s Black Beauty (1877) and the proliferation of dog “autobiographies” such as Gordon
Stable’s Sable and White: The Autobiography of a Show Collie (1893)) or toward the naturalistic
portrayals in realism that affirm the impossibility of knowing what it is like to be an
animal  (while  categorized  with  the  modernists,  D.H.  Lawrence’s  representations  of
animals in The White Peacock (1911) might be taken as an example). Both have an internal
humanist scope, no matter the attribution of mental or moral qualities to the animals in
the  text:  the  first  places  the  animal  in  the  role  of  the  human,  while  the  second
overemphasizes the idea that one cannot know what it is like to be an animal because
animals' minds are not accessible to the human in the same manner that adult human
minds are. Both of these approaches place the adult human as the standard by which all
other creatures must be measured.
15 In  his  essay  “The  Science  of  Fiction”  which  considers  the  contemporary  literary
movement toward realism, Hardy suggests a different way of working. “To see in half and
quarter views the whole picture, to catch from a few bars the whole tune, is the intuitive
power that supplies the would-be story-writer with the scientific bases for his pursuit”,
Hardy writes (Millgate 110). Rather than attempting to picture the perspective of animals
from  a  human  lens  (which  is  intrinsically  anthropomorphic)  or  insisting  on  the
impossibility  of  knowing  what  it  is  like  to  be  an  animal  (which  ignores  the  shared
physiological experience of creatures in a sensory-based material world), Hardy’s idea of
“intuitive  power”  through  “half  and  quarter  views”  creates  a  space  for  a  different
approach to thinking about animals in the text, both human and nonhuman. Often the
interiority of characters’ thoughts are shown not through direct exposition but through
speculations by the narrator based on appearance, through word choices like “it seemed”
and “as if”. His attention is focused on the “moment-by-moment fullness” of embodiment
in a material world, as critics such as Gillian Beer and George Levine have pointed out
(Beer 241)5. In this way, his writing matches Wolfe’s description of posthumanism as an
insistence to “attend to the specificity of the human—its ways of being in the world, its
ways of knowing, observing, and describing” (Wolfe xxv):  Hardy recognizes the space
between physical embodiment in a shared sensory world and mental access to the mind
of the other, acknowledging through “seems” and “as if” the fact that one cannot know
what it is like to be in the mind of the other, human or nonhuman. Influenced by Herbert
Spencer,  Hardy firmly believed that “beyond the knowable,  there must always be an
unknown” (Hardy  1984,  400).  This  mix  of  attention  and intuition  seems  to  put  into
practice  Wolfe’s  proposition  of  a  second  type  of  “finitude”  shared  by  human  and
nonhuman animals.
16 The first type of vulnerability, or finitude, that posthumanist thinkers focus on hinges
upon the idea of  suffering and shared mortality,  perhaps most clearly articulated by
Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century when he shifted the question of  human/
animal rights away from divisions based on linguistic, mental or moral capacity to the
question, “Can they suffer?” (Bentham 283). Jacques Derrida pushed the argument further,
suggesting that this “not-being-able” is the “nonpower at the heart of power”, the shared
experience  of  vulnerability  that  evokes  moments  of  compassion,  given  the  common
finitude of all living creatures is mortality (Derrida 396). Wolfe suggests a second type of
finitude, inextricably linked to this first one; as he explains,
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The first  type  (physical  vulnerability,  embodiment,  and eventually  mortality)  is
paradoxically made unavailable [. . .] to us by the very thing that makes it available
—namely, a second kind of ‘passivity’ or ‘not being able,’ which is the finitude we
experience in our subjection to a radically ahuman technicity or mechanicity of
language, a technicity that has profound consequences, of course, for what we too
hastily think of as ‘our’ concepts, which are therefore in an important sense not
‘ours’ at all. (Wolfe 88)
17 This second finitude presents a paradox: the very tool that humans use to understand the
abstractions of vulnerability and mortality at the same time limits the human to such
language-bound  considerations,  moving  the  unspeakable  into  an  abstraction  and
estranging humans – and nonhumans, at the point of interaction between the two by
means of any semiotic system – from flesh-and-blood experience. Bound up with this
double finitude is often a sense of trauma, a trauma sensed through the body. Attention
to  embodiment  allows  an  awareness  of  this  second  type  of  finitude.  When  Tess
encounters the dying game birds, her first impulse is to strangle them, feeling their agony
in her own person; only as she is killing the birds does she mediate the feeling through
language, and notably she speaks here in dialect rather than “standard” English. In the
same way, when Prince is dying, Tess is moved to cover the wound with her hand, a
useless gesture, but arguably one that demonstrates a sense of Wolfe’s second kind of
finitude.
18 The  idea  of  language  being  “a  radically  ahuman  technicity”  (Wolfe  88)  may  seem
contradictory; after all, language and its system of semiotics, especially when encoded in
written form, has long been seen as, in Wolfe’s words, “a well-nigh-magical property that
ontologically  separates  Homo  sapiens  from  every  living  creature”  (121).  Yet  Wolfe
recognizes that it was “an essentially non- or ahuman emergence from an evolutionary
process”  that  “makes  possible  language  proper  and  the  characteristic  modes  of
consciousness and mentation associated with it, but remains tied [...] to an evolutionary
substrate that continues to express itself in human interaction” (121). Human language in
its  current  form coevolved with the  human,  but  its  emergence  was  not  intrinsically
human. As Charles Darwin pointed out, language evolved “through a gradual process”
(Darwin 1981, 137) and was “completed by innumerable steps, half-consciously made”
(Darwin 2009, 63). Despite the insistence upon language as a marker of the human in the
Victorian  era,  its  roots  are  inevitably  entangled  with  nonhuman  forms  of  semiotic
systems, given the shared ancestry of humans and animals from one common progenitor.
Such a consideration suggests that supposedly “human” concepts,  to echo Wolfe,  are
perhaps not  “‘ours’  at  all”,  and that  the history of  language might  be considered in
similar  terms to other  aspects  of  human evolution that  are simultaneously technical
(rather than “human”) and reciprocally formative (in shaping and being shaped by the
specific  experience  of  being  human),  such  as  trends  in  height  across  time  or  in
diversification  as  seen  in  the  wide  span  of  ethnicities  across  geographic  regions.  A
person’s height or ethnicity may have cultural resonance due to the fact of being human,
and it may shape one’s way of being in the world, but the determination of one’s height or
ethnicity depends upon the technical, mechanical, and arguable “ahuman” processes of
meiosis  and  mitosis,  biological  processes  shared  by  even  the  most  basic  of  plants,
combining for a great percentage the same array of genes used by insentient organic life.
19 Posthumanism, then, is very different from the concept of the “posthuman”, a term that
describes a state in which the human has escaped the vulnerability of the human form by
transforming into a new physical existence, a disembodiment that often focuses on the
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rational and the mechanical – a goal that, as Wolfe points out, is ironically humanist
rather than posthumanist. Tess, who early in the novel postulates that people can escape
their bodies, achieves a complete sense of disassociation from her physical embodiment
by the end of the novel; when Angel finds her living with Alec, he stands silently looking
at her, lost for words. As the narrator explains, “Speech was as inexpressive as silence” in
that moment of “implor[ing] for something to shelter them from reality” (Hardy 2008b,
401). Later, he realizes that what he was feeling was the sense that “his original Tess had
spiritually ceased to recognize the body before him as hers – allowing it to drift, like a
corpse upon the current, in a direction disassociated from its living will” (401). Henchard
has a similar moment when, upon contemplating suicide off a bridge, he sees the effigy
that represented him in the skimmity-ride floating along the river – a parallel image of “a
corpse upon the current” – but for him, the effigy creates a sense of doubling, of an
alternate timeline of what could have happened if the straw-self had not come along at
that  particular moment,  that  jars  him from his  mental  state and prevents him from
killing himself. On the other hand, Tess – who already considers herself “in the light of a
murderess”  after  Prince’s  death  (40)  –  finds  a  material  solution  to  her  cognitive
dissonance created by her role as Alec’s mistress: she rids herself of the body that is
creating the conflict between the self that is Alec’s property as his mistress and the self
that belongs to Angel as his wife. Arguably, her act is rational, her logic shaped by the
humanist society in which she exists.
20 In  contrast  to  the  “posthuman”,  posthumanist thinking  insists  on  close  attention  to
embodiment: to quote Wolfe, it “requires us to attend to that thing called ‘the human’
with  greater specificity, greater attention  to  its  embodiment,  embeddedness,  and
materiality, and how these in turn shape and are shaped by consciousness, mind” while
“pay[ing] proper attention [...]  to the material,  embodied, and evolutionary nature of
intelligence and cognition” (Wolfe 121). Attention to the shared experience of sensory
beings
forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, including
the  normal  perceptual  modes  and  affective  states  of  Homo  sapiens itself,  by
recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of other living beings and
their own autopoietic ways of ‘bringing forth a world’. (Wolfe xxv)
21 Hardy’s willingness to create ambiguity – to “not know”, in the words of Linda Shires –
while simultaneously grounding the text in sensory detail creates a tension that causes
the reader to reconsider his or her perspective on the world (Shires 36). This acceptance
of not-knowing and acknowledgement of the “autopoietic ways” of “other living beings”
can  be  seen,  for  example,  in  his  poem  “An  August  Midnight”,  which  describes  an
encounter between the narrator and four insects (a longlegs, a moth, a dumbledore, and a
fly) who enter his writing space, especially in the last two lines: “‘God’s humblest, they!’ I
muse. Yet why? / They know Earth-secrets that know not I” (Hardy 1981, 147). 
22 In this way Hardy’s writing seems to be an early gesture toward posthumanism, although
obviously he could never have construed it  as  such.  Hardy famously resisted having
critics consider his “works of art as if they were a scientific system of philosophy”: as a
March 1917 letter  –  along with other letters and prefaces –  states,  his  views were “
seemings, provisional impressions only, used for artistic purposes because they represent
approximately  the impressions of  the age,  and are plausible,  till  somebody produces
better theories of the universe” (Hardy 1984, 406). This statement seems to underline the
tenability of language to produce “a scientific system of philosophy”, replacing it instead
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with seemings and impressions, with “half and quarter views”. For Hardy, rethinking
“the  whole  conscious  world  collectively”  moves  beyond  humanist  comparisons  of
similarities  and  differences  and  into  the  posthumanist  realm  of  changing  even  the
approach to thought, into the realm of “grappling”.
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NOTES
1. As Michael Irwin points out, she “is likened to a bird, a cat, a sapling, a flower – as well as to a
fly” (Irwin 33). For further discussions of Tess and animal imagery, see Irwin’s Reading Hardy’s
Landscapes (2000), Elisha Cohen’s “‘No Insignificant Creature’: Thomas Hardy’s Ethical Turn” in
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Nineteenth-Century Literature 64.4 (2010): 494-520, and John Humma’s “Language and Disguise: The
Imagery of Nature and Sex in ‘Tess’” in South Atlantic Review 54.4 (1989): 63-83.
2. See William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1756), 198, and Jacques Derrida’s
“‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject” in Points…Interviews, 1974-1994, 279.
3. Hardy was vehemently against hunting as sport, viewing it as “proof that [humans] have not
yet emerged from barbarism”, as he wrote in a letter on 2 March 1904 to Reverend S. Whittell
Key (Millgate, 201). See also his 14 October 1926 letter to Wilfred P.H. Warner (455).
4. Ritvo  explains  that  “explicit  claims  of  unity  (humans  are  animals)  actually  reinforce  the
human-animal  boundary  that  they  are  intended  to  dissolve”  by  “incorporat[ing]  a  grudging
acknowledgement that this boundary is widely recognized and powerfully influential. Why else
would  it  be  continually  necessary  to  deny  its  validity  –  or  to  remind  ourselves  of  its
arbitrariness?” (Ritvo 271).
5. Beer comments that Hardy attempts to deal with the problem of anthropomorphism by
grounding his writing in “the senses” and “the material world” (Beer 258). See George Levine’s
“Hardy and Darwin: An Enchanting Hardy?” in A Companion to Thomas Hardy, ed. Keith Wilson,
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 36-53, for an exploration of enchantment with the material
world.
ABSTRACTS
In his  1910 letter to the Humanitarian League,  Hardy wrote of  “a re-adjustment of  altruistic
morals  […]  beyond  the  area  of  mere  mankind  to  that  of  the  whole  animal  kingdom”.  He
concluded the letter by saying, “And though I myself do not at present see how the principle of
equal justice all round is to be carried out in its entirety, I recognize that the League is grappling
with the  question”  (Hardy 1984, 377).  This  article  explores  two questions  in  order  to  better
understand  Hardy’s  own  “grappling  with  the  question”.  First,  how  does  Hardy’s  figuring  of
animals subtly undercut the prevalent attitudes not only toward animals in the humanist era in
which he lived, but also toward women and the idea of what is human? Second, could Hardy’s
approach be described as – in some sense of the word – posthumanist? The first  half  of  the
discussion focuses around portrayals of woman-as-animal (in the person of Tess Durbeyfield) and
man-as-human (in  the  character  of  Michael  Henchard),  with  close  readings  from Tess  of  the
d’Urbervilles (1891) and The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) that seek to untangle the effect binaries of
human/animal and man/woman have upon each text. The article then considers whether and
how Hardy’s work fits into the current theoretical framework of posthumanism, exploring ideas
of vulnerability and embodiment. 
Dans une lettre de 1910 à la Ligue humanitaire, Hardy évoque “un réajustement de la morale
altruiste  […]  au-delà  de  la  simple  sphère  humaine  jusqu’au  royaume  animal  tout  entier”.  Il
conclut sa lettre ainsi : “Et, bien que je ne voie pas à présent comment ce principe de justice et
d’égalité peut être porté dans son intégralité, je reconnais que la ligue se saisit de la question” (
Hardy 1984, 377). Cet article explore deux points afin de mieux saisir la façon dont Hardy lui-
même  se  “saisit  de  la  question”.  Premièrement,  comment  la  représentation  hardyenne  des
animaux  subvertit-elle  subtilement  les  attitudes  de  l’époque  non  seulement  à  l’égard  des
animaux, mais aussi à l’égard des femmes et de l’idée de ce qui est humain ? Deuxièmement, cela
permet-il de qualifier l’approche hardyenne de “posthumaniste”, dans un certain sens du terme ?
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La première  partie  du débat  se  concentre  sur  les  portraits  de  femme comme animaux (Tess
Durbeyfield) et d’hommes comme humains (Michael Henchard), à partir de lectures précises de
Tess of the d’Urberville (1891) et de The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) qui tentent de dénouer les effets
que  les  couples  notionnels  homme/animal  et  homme/femme ont  sur  chaque  texte.  L’article
évalue ensuite la façon dont l’œuvre de Hardy correspond ou non au cadre théorique actuel du
posthumanisme, en examinant les notions de vulnérabilité et d’incarnation. 
INDEX
Keywords: humanity, animal, posthumanism, suffering, finitude, gender
Mots-clés: humanité, animal, posthumanisme, souffrance, finitude, genre
AUTHOR
ANNA WEST
Anna West is an early career researcher whose work focuses on Thomas Hardy and animal
studies. She received her PhD from the University of St Andrews. Her first monograph, Thomas
Hardy and Animals, is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press in 2017.
Posthumanist Hardy?: Rethinking “the Whole Conscious World Collectively”
FATHOM, 4 | 2016
11
